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Criminal Procedure-Equal Protection-The Dual Impact of Tate v.
Short on Default Imprisonment and Monetary Bail
The inequality and blatant discriminations which face many indi-
gents in the criminal process would shock many Americans who naively
believe that the phrase "with liberty and justice for all" accurately
describes the criminal process. Would the average American believe that
an estimated seventy-five percent of the persons in jail are there because
of inability to pay fines?1 Would not most Americans be shocked and
embarrassed to know that approximately forty-nine percent of all ar-
rested persons are detained in jail before trial or any determination of
guilt for inability to post monetary bail?2 The first of these inequalities
was mitigated when default imprisonment, the practice of imprisoning
indigents because of their inability to pay fines, was recently declared
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Tate v. Short.3
An extrapolation of the Tate Court's equal protection analysis presages
further mitigation of inequalities in the area of monetary bail.
The petitioner in Tate was fined upon conviction of nine traffic
offenses. Because he could not afford to pay the fine, the court converted
the fine into a prison sentence pursuant to a statutory formula. The
petitioner subsequently applied for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that
he was in jail solely due to discrimination based on wealth. The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's denial of the writ and held that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the states from
imposing a fine as the sentence and then converting it into a prison term
when the defendant is unable to pay the fine.'
Since the landmark case of Griffin v. Illinois,5 invidious discrimina-
tions based on wealth have been prohibited. Moreover, although the
states obviously are not required to equalize completely all effects of
unequal economic status,6 classifications based on wealth have come by
'Note, Fines and Fining-An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as Fines and Fining].2Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693,
707 (1958). Bail is generally set at a pretrial hearing held only to establish whether a prima facie
ease exists.
-401 U.S. 395 (1971).
1401 U.S. at 399.
5351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Griffin, the Court held that the state may not structure appellate review
in a way that discriminates on the basis of wealth.
'Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
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decisional evolution to be "constitutionally suspect" and subject to the
"most rigid scrutiny" regardless of the underlying legislative purpose.7
In addition, classifications which substantially infringe upon fundamen-
tal constitutional rights must be necessary to promote a compelling state
interest.8 Thus the default-imprisonment and monetary-bail practices
should both be subject to strict scrutiny, since both involve classifica-
tions based on wealth and both may result in the deprivation of personal
liberty.' With respect to default imprisonment, at least, the Supreme
Court has evidenced agreement with this proposition.
The Court's initial examination of default imprisonment came in
Williams v. Illinois."0 There the defendant had been sentenced to one
year in jail and a five-hundred-dollar fine for petty theft. When the
defendant was unable to pay the fine, he was imprisoned beyond the
statutory maximum of one year in order to serve a sufficient number of
days to satisfy his fine." The Court held that the equal protection clause
requires that the maximum imprisonment for any offense be the same
for all defendants regardless of their wealth. The Court acknowledged
the state's interest in collecting fines but discounted the necessity of
imprisonment because alternatives existed which would also serve that
interest.12 Although Williams involved a situation in which default im-
rThe quoted phrases are taken from McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
McLaughlin involved a classification based on race, which was the first declared by the Court to
be suspect. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966), the Court included
wealth as a "suspect criterion." In contrast, the equal protection standard applied when the
classification is not "suspect" and does not affect fundamental rights is whether the classification
bears a rational relationship to a permissible legislative purpose. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425 (1960). In McLaughlin the Court compared these two standards, stating with respect to a
"suspect classification" that "[s]uch a law, even though enacted pursuant to a valid state interest,
bears a heavy burden of justification . . . and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely
rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." 379 U.S. at 196 (emphasis
by the Court).
"Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
'The determination of whether or not to subject a classification based on wealth to strict
scrutiny has been conceptualized as the assessment of two interlocking gradients. The first scale
ranks classifications with the most invidious at the top and the second ranks individual rights
affected by the classification in ascending order of importance. When the classification in question
is at the top of the first gradient, it is subject to strict review even if the individual interest it affects
is low on the second. However, as the classifications become less invidious, they get strict review
only if they affect interests progressively more important. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1120 (1969).
90399 U.S. 235 (1970). The Court had earlier tacitly approved default imprisonment in Hill v.
Wampler, 298 U.S. 460 (1936) and Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
"399 U.S. at 236.
12d. at 244.
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prisonment resulted in confinement beyond the maximum sentence, it
recognized the inequalities inherent in that practice.
In Tate the Court relied heavily upon Williams. 3 Texas had legis-
lated a "fines only" sentence for traffic offenses, which the Court treated
in effect as imposing a statutory maximum imprisonment of zero days
in jail. Thus any conversion of a traffic-offense fine would have resulted
in a prison term in excess of the statutory maximum which had already
been condemned by Williams. However, the language of the Tate
opinion goes far beyond the facts of the case and suggests the elimination
of default imprisonment even if the maximum sentence is not exceeded.
The only apparent motivation for the Tate opinion was a desire to
expand Williams, which four members of the Court had already demon-
strated strongly in another case 4 decided after Williams and before Tate.
Thus the Court's statement in Tate that "the Constitution prohibits the
State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically convert-
ing it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot
forthwith pay the fine in full" 15 indicates that automatic default impri-
sonment denies equal protection whether or not the maximum imprison-
ment for the offense is exceeded. This interpretation has in fact been
followed in Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Ohio. 6
The Court held that default imprisonment violates the equal protec-
tion clause not only because it discriminates on the basis of wealth but
also because constitutional alternatives are available to accomplish the
state's purpose of securing payment of fines.' 7 After Tate a state is forced
either to eliminate fines in their entirety 8 or to adopt one or a combina-
tion of those alternatives. The most equitable and useful alternative is
13"We reverse on the authority of our decision in Williams v. Illinois." 401 U.S. at 397.
"Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 (1970). The district court judgment was vacated and
remanded per curiam because a change in the Maryland default imprisonment statute mooted the
equal protection question.
1"401 U.S. at 398, quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970).
16Johnson v. State, 250 So. 2d 347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Tackett, . Hawaii
483 P.2d 191 (1971); Spurlock v. Noe, 467 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1971); State v. DeBonis, 58
N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971); In re Jackson, 26 Ohio St. 2d 51, 268 N.E.2d 812 (1971).
1401 U.S. at 399. For general discussions of proposed alternatives, see, e.g., S. RUBIN, TIM
LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION (1963); Comment, Fines, Imprisonment and the Poor: "Thirty
Dollars or Thirty Days, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 778 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Thirty Dollars or Thirty
Days]; Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. Rev.
435 (1967).
"8"Eliminating the fine whenever it is prescribed as alternative punishment avoids the equal
protection issue that indigency occasions. ... 401 U.S. at 401 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
[Vol. 50
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to permit indigents to pay their fines in installments over a reasonable
period of time." The success of this procedure has been demonstrated
in Sweden and Britain where dramatic decreases in the number of default
imprisonments occurred after its adoption.
2 1
The disadvantages of an installment plan in requiring an increased
number of administrative personnel should be outweighed by the in-
creased collection of fines and decreased cost of maintaining prisoners. 2'
Additionally, permitting the defendant to remain out of jail allows him
to keep or to get a job that may prevent his family from going on
welfare. As with all of the available proposed alternatives, the install-
ment plan strives to assure that when the state declares that the penal
sanction for a particular offense is to be a fine and that a jail sentence
is not deemed necessary to accomplish the state's objective of retribu-
tion, rehabilitation, and deterrence, then an indigent defendant will not
be imprisoned for failure to pay that fine. One other advantage of the
installment plan is that it avoids the detrimental effects of short-term
imprisonment. The state can use alone, or in conjunction with an install-
ment plan, day fines 2 or some type of supervised release or probation2
3
"
2This proposal has been extensively discussed. E.g., Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days; Note, The
Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the Indigent for Nonpayment Qf Fines, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 938 (1966); Fines and Fining 1022.
"The recorded drop in Sweden was from 13,358 in 1932 to 286 in 1946 and in Britain was
from an average of 83,187 during the period 1909-1913 to 2,667 in 1946. Fines and Fining 1023.
Although these statistics may be influenced by other variables, they do show the effect of an
installment plan.21The estimated cost of maintaining defendants in jail is at least $6.00 per day per man.
Comment, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941,
943 (1970).
2'lhe severity of the offense is established by the court as a particular number of days and
each day is then assigned a monetary value based on the defendant's wealth, income, capacity to
work, dependents, debts and so forth. Because the day fine is tailored to each individual's ability
to pay, there is an increased chance that each defendant will pay his fine and the deterrent effect is
increased because collection should be assured. Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days 813; Fines and Fining
1024.
23For a description of conditional probation and work release, see, e.g., Zalba, Work Relea-
se-A Two-Pronged Effect, 13 CRIME & DELINQ. 506 (1967); Note, Imprisonment for Non-payment
of Fines and Costs: A New Look at the Law and the Constitution, 22 VAND. L. REV. 611, 627
(1969). It is also possible to use a partial confinement which has the same equal protection defects
but is, at least, not as harsh as total imprisonment. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 2A (Approved Draft 1968)
[hereinafter cited as SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES]. In conjunction with probation, indigents may be
given jobs on state projects or with the local government.
The Court left it to the states to adopt an already existing alternative or to develop new ones.
401 U.S. at 400.
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which are especially useful for the indigent with so little money that
allowing him to pay installments will not help.
The inherent problem with all proposed alternatives is their enforce-
ment. In Tate, the Court emphasized that it was not ruling on whether
imprisonment could be used to enforce the alternatives adopted by the
state when the alternatives are unsuccessful despite the defendant's rea-
sonable attempt at compliance. 4 Imprisonment to penalize contuma-
cious failure to pay fines is unaffected by the Tate decision.' 5 Beyond
that, the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association
both suggest imprisonment as a means to enforce the adopted alterna-
tives .2 However, imposing a jail sentence for a default on an installment
is again a discrimination based on wealth if the reason for the default is
financial inability. Because Tate relied heavily on the existence of alter-
natives in declaring default imprisonment unconstitutional; the equal
protection argument against imprisonment for failure to meet install-
ments which were tailored to the individual defendant would be less
persuasive because of the decreased number of available alternatives.
However, to prevent violation of the equal protection clause, the state
should establish a system of probation, jobs on state projects, or supe-
rvised release which, although still restrictive of the defendant's freedom,
are less onerous alternatives than imprisonment. It has also been sug-
gested that if the defendant cannot pay an installment and has made a
good-faith effort to do so, the fine should be changed or even revoked, 2
on the theory that enough deterrent and rehabilitative effect has been
administered in the process of attempting the alternative even though it
was unsuccessful. In ruling on whether a state's use of imprisonment to
enforce the alternative adopted violates the equal protection clause, the
Court would have to consider the alternatives chosen, their administra-
tion, the opportunities available to an indigent defendant who cannot
pay the installment, and other methods that could be used by a state in
2401 U.S. at 400.
2The Court emphasized that imprisonment was not unconstitutional when the defendant had
the means to pay his fine but refused to do so. Id. at 400.21Unless the defendant shows that his default on an installment payment was in good-faith,
the default is contumacious and a jail sentence is imposed. MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.2(t) (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962); SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES § 6.5(b). The most perplexing problem
concerns enforcement if the default is not contumacious. The American Law Institute suggests that
the court allow the defendant more time, reduce the amount of the installment, or revoke the fine.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.2(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
2Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days 820.
[Vol. 50
TATE V. SHORT
lieu of imprisonment. In order to afford indigents the equal protection
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, a state should eliminate de-
fault imprisonment, replacing it with an individualized installment plan
augmented by supervised release and work projects.
An extrapolation of the Court's analysis of the constitutional ques-
tion in Tate logically requires the invalidation of the highly criticized
administration of monetary bail. 28 The purpose of bail is to insure that
the defendant will be present for his trial. The theory is that if a defen-
dant is required to leave a financial deposit with the court or a bonds-
man, this deposit will deter his fleeing and assure his appearance. A
separate opinion of Justice Jackson in Stack v. Boyle2 1 said that the
"spirit" of the bail system is to allow persons to stay out of jail until
their guilt has been established at trial. 3 Although the Court has used
eloquent phrases to emphasize the importance of pretrial freedom to the
preparation of a defense and the injustice of punishment before convic-
tion,3 ' it has been reported that as many as seventy percent of all arrested
persons are subjected to pretrial punishment for inability to post bail. 32
The present method of bail created the professional bail bondsmen
whose authority has become so widespread as to evoke the comment that
they "hold the keys to the jail in their pockets." 33 The deplorable effects
of pretrial detention have been voluminously catalogued. 34 The most
egregious inequality that requires reform of the bail system is its effect
21"The American bail system is a scandal." R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE
AMERICAN BAIL SYsTEM 4 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GOLDFARB]. "It is not only unfair; it is
illogical, it does not even work well." Id. at 4-5. "At best, it is a system of checkbook justice; at
worst, a highly commercialized racket." Goldberg, Foreward to id. at ix.
-342 U.S. 1 (1951).
sold. at 8.
31E.g., id. at 4.
32\Vald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 631,
634 (1964). Other results showed over seventy percent in Baltimore and St. Louis; thirty to forty
percent in Washington, D.C.; and sixty-two percent in Chicago. Id. It has been estimated that fifty-
two percent of all bondable arrested persons stayed in jail. Note, Bail or Jail: Toward an
Alternative, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 59, 62 (1968). Another study reported an estimate of forty-nine
percent. Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 693,
707 (1958). Although the figures are divergent, they do at least show that substantial numbers of
arrested persons are incarcerated prior to trial for inability to post bail.
1Pannel v. U.S. 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., concurring). The corruption
and discretionary power of bondsmen are discussed in GOLDFARB 909; Comment. Bail: An Ancient
Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 971 (1961).
3See, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79
YALE L.J. 941,943 (1970).
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on verdicts and sentences. One study found that the percentage of defen-
dants who are jailed before trial who were convicted was eighty-two,
while only fifty-two percent of the bailed defendants were convicted. 5
The same study concludes that bail also affects the sentence: twenty-two
percent of the bailed defendants received a prison sentence compared to
fifty-nine percent of the jailed defendants.36 The courts and legislatures
should correct these inequities.
The initial Supreme Court mention of this inequality was rendered
in a dissent in Griffin v. Illinois:37 "Why fix bail at any reasonable sum
if a poor man can't make it?" Later Justice Douglas in Bandy v. United
States3 succinctly stated the issue as being whether "an indigent [can]
be denied freedom where a wealthy man would not, because he does not
happen to have enough property to pledge for his freedom[.] ''39 This
issue should be resolved by applying strict constitutional scrutiny4" and
the Tate constitutional-atlernatives analysis to the monetary-bail prac-
tice, which involves a classification based on wealth and which seriously
affects the fundamental right to freedom.
Monetary bail in itself is inefficient in achieving the purpose of
assuring the defendant's appearance at trial. The deterrent effect of the
threat of monetary forfeiture is minimal compared to that deriving from
the fear of being a hunted fugitive and from the threat of a more severe
sentence if the bail-jumper is caught." In addition, in Bandy Justice
Douglas pointed out that other strong assurances of appearance at
35Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA.
L. REv. 1031, 1052 (1954).
36Id. at 1053. Another study reported similar results: fifty-three percent of the bailed defendants
were convicted compared to seventy-three percent of the jailed defendants; seventeen percent of the
bailed defendants were sentenced to prison as compared to sixty-four percent of the jailed defen-
dants. Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641, 642 (1964). To establish
a causal relationship between detention and unfavorable verdicts and sentences, this study isolated
other factors which could have influenced the above figures. The results showed that prior record,
bail amount, type of counsel, family integration and employment stability did not substantially
affect the unfavorable dispositions, thus strengthening the correlation and causal relation between
pretrial detention and the disposition of the case. Id. at 655.
"Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29 (1956).
81 S. Ct. 197 (1960) (Douglas, Cir. J.).
31Id. at 198, Justice Douglas later considered Bandy's application for release on recognizance
and said that "[fQurther reflection has led me to conclude that no man should be denied release
because of indigence." Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. I1, 13 (1961) (Douglas, Cir. J.).
4 See note 9 & accompanying text supra.
4 Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA.
L. REv. 1031, 1060 (1954).
[Vol. 50
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trial-such as long residence in the locality, ties with family and friends,
and the increased efficiency of the police-may exist.42 In Tate the Court
noted that default imprisonment does not meaningfully serve the state's
purpose of collecting fines.43 Thus the default-imprisonment and mone-
tary-bail practices are similar in that their efficiency is highly questiona-
ble. Moreover, as is true with respect to default imprisonment,4 the
monetary-bail system saddles the state with the expense of maintaining
the defendant in jail,45 and its elimination would save the state money.
The final link in Tate was the availability of alternatives which
allowed the Court to strike down default imprisonment without leaving
a void in the sentencing and enforcement process. Tested alternatives
also exist which should be required in replacement of the bail system.4
The Manhattan Bail Project has been used to assist the court in deter-
mining the defendant's reliability to return for trial without imposing
monetary bail.4 The most attractive alternative available to a state is
release on recognizance,4" which should be used in conjunction with
increased penalties for failure to appear at trial.49 Another alternative is
supervised release, which is similar to probation in that the travel of the
defendant may be restricted or the defendant may be required to report
periodically to an officer of the court or a third-party individual or
1181S. Ct. at 198.
3401 U.S. at 399.
"Id.
'"The total cost of maintaining the 22,343 persons detained awaiting federal trials in 1963 was
estimated at over $4,000,000. GOLDFARB 43-44. The cost to New York City of pretrial detention
was estimated at over $10,000.000 in 1962. Id. at 45. Washington, D.C., estimated that it could
save $105,768 per year in prison expenses and welfare payments if afi persons eligible for bail were
released. Paulsen, Pre-Trial Release in the United States, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 109, 114 (1966).
"For an interesting and highly informative treatment of the bail dilemma and constitutional
alternatives, see Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pts. I-1I), 113 U. PA. L. REv.
959, 1125 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Foote]. See also, e.g.. Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days; Com-
ment, Indigent Court Costs and Bail: Charge Them to Equal Protection, 27 MD. L. REV. 154
(1967).
"Basically, the system involves interviewing and collecting information concerning the arres-
tee's prior record, residence, employment, and family in order to predict the probability that he
will return for trial without monetary bail. Foote 961. It is a useful tool but does not eliminate the
inequality of pretrial detention for those persons recommended and not released.
"The method of release on recognizance requires the defendant to sign a statement promising
to return at a specified time for his trial. See, e.g., GOLDFARB 186; D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN
THE UNITED STATES 76 (1964).
418 U.S.C. § 3150 (1970) provides for penalties up to five years and $5,000 for failure to
appear after release from a felony charge and one year and $1,000 if the charge was a misdemeanor.
For results of statistical studies on the use of release on recognizance, see D. FREED & P. WALD,
BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 62 (1964).
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group.5 For minor offenses, a procedure similar to that used for parking
violations has been suggested-a summons in lieu of arrest.5' This proce-
dure simply involves notifying the person of a date to appear for trial
and thereby eliminating the arrest and bail process. These alternatives
are available to the state5 2 and, as with those of default imprisonment,
should be used as the situation merits in conjunction with one another.1
In Tate the Supreme Court eliminated inequalities in the criminal
procedure which affect the post-trial liberty of indigent defendants. The
constitutional analysis in Tate-focusing on available alternatives -can
be applied to alleviate the even harsher inequalities brought about by
wealth discriminations in the bail system so that a man is entitled to
pretrial liberty regardless of his wealth. An indigent who cannot post
bail is deprived of his freedom prior to any judicial determination of
guilt or innocence. The Court has declared default imprisonment uncon-
stitutional because it works an invidious discrimination on indigents. 4
The same analytical approach should be applied to the bail system in
order to eliminate its inequalities. Both discrimnations are based on
suspect classifications affecting the fundamental right of liberty. While
failing to serve a penal objective of the state, they both saddle the state
with maintenance expenses and most importantly they are not necessary
because either can be replaced with constitutional alternatives which
accomplish the state's objectives. The Court has taken the first step in
eliminating inequalities in post-trial detention; it should apply the same
reasoning process to the unconstitutional pretrial detention of indigents.
JOHN D. LOWERY
0One method tried in Tulsa, Oklahoma was to release the defendant to his attorney. If a
defendant did not appear at trial, his attorney's name was removed from the list of attorneys to
whom prisoners could be released. During a ten-month period, approximately 2,000 defendants
were released and only thirteen of the three hundred and ten participating attorneys were removed
from the list. D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (1964). Presently, supervised
release is discretionary in federal courts. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1) (1970).
51E.g., GOLDFARB 167.
521t is beyond the scope of this note to discuss the issues raised by preventive detention, which
involves denying pretrial freedom on the basis of dangerousness to society rather than any educated
estimate of likelihood to appear for trial. For a discussion of this area, see, e.g., Foote 1164;
Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 U. VA. L. REv. 1223
(1969); Note, The Costs of Preventive Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 926 (1970).
OFor example, one writer proposes summons in lieu of arrest for petty offenses, a judicial
choice between release on recognizance and supervised release for more serious offenses, and preven-
tive detention of dangerous defendants. GOLDFARB 244.
-"401 U.S. at 397.
[Vol. 50
